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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE "RULE 
OF LAW"t 
Phillip R. Trimble* 
IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES. By John H. Jackson, Jean-
Victor Louis and Mitsuo Matsushita. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press. 1984. Pp. 223. $18. 
For at least a quarter of a century, lawyers, diplomats and politi-
cians have debated the extent to which the "rule of law" should gov-
ern American foreign policy and international relations. 1 During that 
period proponents of the "rule of law" have scored a number of im-
portant victories, particularly in the economic sphere. For example, 
foreign governments may now be sued with respect to "commercial 
activities" (expansively defined), and claims of foreign sovereign im-
munity are subject to judicial, rather than executive, determination.2 
Foreign governments may also be held judicially accountable in dam-
ages for violations of international human rights law.3 In addition, 
foreign confiscatory expropriations may be challenged in American 
courts, where they will be judged under American views of interna-
tional law. 4 Finally, American foreign and economic policy actions 
t The comments of William Alford, Nancy Bekavac and Arthur Rosett on an earlier draft 
of this review were especially appreciated. 
• Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A. 1958, Ohio Univer-
sity; M.A. 1959, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; LL.B. 1963, Harvard University. 
The author served as Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic and Business Affairs of the Depart-
ment of State from 1974-1977, and as American Ambassador to the Kingdom of Nepal from 
1980-1981. - Ed. 
1. Compare G. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 95-101 (1951), with D. 
MOYNIHAN, LoYALTIES 61-96 (1984); and compare T. NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND THE 
RELATIONS OF STATES (1983), with Hoffman, International Law and the Control of Force, in 
THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (K. Deutsch & s. Hoffman eds. 1968), and L. 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CoNSTITUTJON 259-66 (1972), and compare Leigh & 
Atkeson, Due Process in the Emerging Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 22 Bus, LAW. 
3 (1966), with A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-33, 183-98 (1962), and T. 
FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CoNGRESS 155-62 (1979), and Trimble, Foreign 
Policy Frustrated - Dames & Moore, Claims Court Jurisdiction and a New Raid on the Treas-
ury, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 317, 364-66, 373-77 (1984). 
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892, codified at 
28 u.s.c. §§ 1602-1611 (1982). 
3. See Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Letelier v. Republic of 
Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980); see also Argentine Torture Victim Wins Redress in U.S. 
Court, L.A. Times, Oct. 20, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (referring to Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-
1772-RMT (MCx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (Takasugi, J.)). 
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1982); 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982) (effectively overruling 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 
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are increasingly subject to judicial scrutiny under the "takings" clause 
of the Constitution. 5 
Although appeals to the "rule of law" may seem difficult to resist, 
some commentators (including this one) harbor reservations concern-
ing these developments. 6 At least it seems appropriate to examine 
more carefully what "law" is going to rule, and whose interests are 
going to be served. International trade is a particularly appropriate 
field of study in this regard because it is especially laden with rules. In 
fact, a subset of the general debate has focused on the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT), and specifically on how best 
to understand the GATT's contribution to the "rule of law." 
For most of the GATT's history the cognoscenti have debated why 
it works and how (if at all) it should be changed. One group - the 
pragmatists - attributes the GATT's success to the "nonlegalistic," 
"impressionistic" approach it takes to the application of rules. 7 In this 
view, the principal value of the GATT is that it provides a process 
through which trade problems are negotiated and compromised within 
a general framework of rules. The compromises may not always be 
technically in accordance with the "law" as a court would apply it, but 
most problems have in fact been defused, and the overall system has 
held together with great success. 
Another group - the legalists - believes that "[t]here is a danger 
... in making a virtue out of necessity."8 The GATT may have suc-
ceeded despite the pragmatic approach, not because of it. Moreover, 
just because the GATT has operated that way in the past does not 
mean that it should continue to do so in the future. For the legalists, a 
central objective of the system is to enable private entrepreneurs to 
plan economic decisions and thereby maximize efficiency. To this end 
they need stability and predictability. The rules must be clear, and the 
best way to assure clarity is through a system of impartial adjudication 
Whitlock & Co., 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967); REsrATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
(Revised) § 713 reporter's note 6 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). 
5. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688-90 (1981); De Arellano v. Weinberger, 
745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane); In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 
F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982); Langenegger v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 229 (1984); Shanghai Power 
Co. v. United States, 4 CL Ct. 237 (1983). 
6. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note l; Trimble, supra note l; Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations: Dispute Settlement, 74 AM. Soc. INT. L. PROC. 129, 134-36, 138-39 (1980) (com-
ments of Graham & deKieffer) [hereinafter cited as MTN Panel]. 
1. See, e.g., K. DAM, THE GAIT- LAW AND INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION (1970); R. HUDEC, THE GAIT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975); 
DEKIEFFER, GAIT Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in International and U.S. Trade Law, 
2 Nw. J. Intl. L. & Bus. 317 (1980). 
8. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT 756 (1969). See generally id. at 
756-68; Herzstein, The Role of Law and Lawyers Under the New Multilateral Trade Agreements, 
9 GA. J. INTL. & CoMP. L. 177 (1979); Jackson, International Economic Problems and Their 
Management in the 21st Century, 9 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 497 (1979); MTN Panel, supra note 
6, at 137 (comments of Jackson). 
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that is routinely used by governments to develop a common law of 
trade. 
In the legalists' view, the "pragmatic" approach fails to achieve the 
necessary predictability because it reserves too great a role for negotia-
tion of disputes, with the prospect of diplomatic intervention and 
"political" compromise. Diplomats are thus seen as a major obstacle 
on the road to free trade. Against this background, Implementing the 
Tokyo Round: National Constitutions and International Economic 
Rules finds yet another obstacle: national parliaments and domestic 
political structures. To reach David Ricardo's Promised Land, we ap-
parently must do more than restrain misguided diplomacy; we must 
curtail representative government as well. 
The authors seek to call attention to the "the little-studied interre-
lationship of the national legal systems to th[e] international [eco-
nomic] system" (p. 210). They point out that domestic procedures for 
negotiating, accepting and implementing treaties are critical to under-
standing the inevitable (if unfortunate) limitations on the role of inter-
national law. They cite two major types of limitation. First, there are 
constraints on the kinds of agreements that can be negotiated. In a 
federal system some subjects may not be within the competence of the 
national government. Thus, Australia and Canada may not be consti-
tutionally authorized to accept international rules governing provin-
cial government procurement, thereby preventing the extension of free 
trade to that arena. 
Second, there are disparities among countries in the domestic im-
plementation of agreements. Some legislatures may not pass specific 
legislation implementing new international obligations, perhaps rely-
ing instead on the constitutional supremacy of treaties. In some na-
tions judicial review to enforce a treaty may not be available. 
Different parties to an agreement may therefore carry out an accepted 
obligation with widely differing degrees of effectiveness. Those dispar-
ities, in tum, may cast doubt on the basic fairness of the system. 
To eliminate those disparities and the problems thus caused by do-
mestic political systems, the authors propose an international judicial 
procedure in which private parties could directly challenge treaty vio-
lations by governments: 
[G]ovemments and business firms do desire greater predictability of na-
tional government economic actions in an increasingly interdependent 
world, and do desire greater balance and equality in actual implementa-
tion of negotiated international rules on economic matters. Those factors 
could lead governments to be willing to accept some sort of a mechanism 
by which individual citizens or firms could appeal directly to an interna-
tional body like the GATT to determine whether a government obligated 
under the GATT or one of its codes has taken an action that is inconsis-
tent with its international obligations. [P. 208.] 
The authors add that the proposed procedure is unlikely to include 
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"truly effective sanctions," but they say that the institution could nev-
ertheless make "reliable third-party determination on [sic] the facts 
and the application of the law" (p. 208). 
In this regard they escalate the legalists' demand for GA TT reform 
(under which existing GATT tribunals would be made more effective9) 
to an appeal for the creation of an entirely new international court ( or 
"supercourt" as I shall call it), apparently "above" even the GATT 
itself. Although the authors do not call the proposed institution a 
"court," I take it they are talking about an institution that makes final 
and binding decisions; otherwise the reformed system would have the 
same problems of uneven implementation, the criticism of which is a 
central theme of this book. Accordingly, it is not unfair to character-
ize the proposed institution as a court, and one of very broad jurisdic-
tion indeed. Through the authors' supercourt, the "rule of law," too 
long suppressed in GATT practice, is to be revived with a vengeance. 
Implementing the Tokyo Round makes a valuable contribution to 
the debate over the GATT and the role of law in foreign affairs gener-
ally. It buttresses the legalists' case by demonstrating the potential 
unfairness of the GATT system that results from different national 
approaches toward implementing international agreements. 
Although most of the book is taken up with summary descriptions 
of constitutional structure, it provides a good outline of the trade law 
environment in three important jurisdictions: Japan, the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the United States. It also takes ten-
tative steps toward integrating analyses of bureaucratic behavior and 
the political environment with a more conventional rule-oriented ap-
proach. The book accordingly introduces the reader to "political" 
concerns that are sometimes assumed to be extraneous to truly "legal" 
analysis, an assumption that occasionally surfaces in the book under 
review. Nevertheless, those political factors surely are important to 
any meaningful understanding of the role of international law - or 
any law - in the real world. 
Perhaps this study will, as the authors hope, provoke further inter-
disciplinary exploration of comparable legal and constitutional con-
straints that exist in other legal cultures. The "multinational" 
approach embodied in this book, drawing on the insights of authors 
from each of the jurisdictions analyzed, is certainly worth following. 
The book's concluding chapter applies its principal themes to po-
9. In the Tokyo Round, the legalists and the pragmatists clashed over reform of the GATT 
dispute settlement machinery. MTN Panel, supra note 6, at 131 (comments of Hudec). The 
pragmatists seem to have won. See id. at 131-33; Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the 
Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CoRNELL INTL. L.J. 145 (1980); Jackson, Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, 73 AM. Soc. INT. L. PROC. 56 (1979); Note, Dispute Settlement Pursu-
ant to the Agreement of Technical Barriers to Trade: The United States-Japan Metal Bat Dispute, 
7 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. 137 (1984). 
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tential negotiations on trade in services, 10 investment and capital 
flows, and notes the limitations that may affect those negotiations. It 
also briefly analyzes the structure of the existing international eco-
nomic system and prescribes the supercourt remedy. 
Although the authors concede that their recommendation regard-
ing the supercourt "will probably not be readily accepted" by govern-
ments (p. 208), I am not persuaded that it should be. As I will explain 
in Part II, the book does not follow through with the implications of 
its basic thesis in two important respects. First, the authors do not 
come to terms with the barriers to acceptance of the supercourt that 
are imposed by the very domestic political processes they have de-
scribed. They also do not examine the potential incompatibility of 
their proposed institution with deeply embedded ideas of representa-
tive government. It seems to me that the requirements of political ac-
countability enshrined in the democracies examined may well preclude 
locating such significant authority essentially outside the domestic 
political process. 
Second, the authors call attention to "limitations" imposed by do-
mestic law on the use and effectiveness of international agreements. In 
doing so they overlook a major advantage of those limitations, even 
from the point of view of strengthening international law. The same 
domestic political process that inhibits the effective expansion of inter-
national law also confers a measure of legitimacy upon those norms 
that successfully emerge from that process. In my view the limitations 
seen by the authors should instead be seen as benefits. The future of 
effective international rule making lies in more extensive involvement 
of domestic political institutions, not in the impartial dispensations of 
an international court. 
I 
The book begins with a brief overview of the international eco-
nomic system, including a sketch of the trade negotiations culminating 
in the establishment of the GATT in 1947. Successive GATT negotia-
tions, or "rounds," led to steadily diminishing levels of tariffs that con-
tributed significantly to the economic growth of the last three 
decades. 11 The most recent negotiation, the Tokyo Round, which 
lasted from 1973 to 1979, was an ambitious new attempt to extend 
international regulation to more subtle and politically sensitive 
non tariff barriers to trade. The agenda included government procure-
ment practices, national administration of product standards, customs 
10. The Reagan administration has advocated a new GAIT "round" to negotiate a code on 
trade in services, as well as bilateral agreements serving the same end. New Era in Service Ex-
ports, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1984, at DI, col. 3. 
11. See Lipson, The transformation of trade: the sources and effects of regime change, 36 
INTL. 0RG. 417, 424-28 (1982). 
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valuation procedures and the especially sensitive rules designed to pro-
tect against the "unfair" trade practices of subsidies and dumping. All 
these practices can effectively discriminate against, or protect domestic 
producers from, imports of foreign products. During the Tokyo 
Round, nine codes (the Multilateral Trade Negotiation, or MTN, 
agreements) dealing with non tariff barriers were negotiated.12 
The main part of the book shows how those codes were imple-
mented by the EEC, Japan and the United States, each of which is 
treated by the author from that particular jurisdiction. The book is 
unified through a common set of questions, focusing on the domestic 
authority to negotiate and accept the MTN agreements and on the 
process of implementing the obligations assumed. The authors also 
specifically examine the role of the judiciary and private rights of 
action. 
A. Japan 
Professor Matsushita offers a lucid account of the Japanese consti-
tutional system and, more importantly, a description of the policy-
making process and extralegal factors that are critical to understand-
ing that system. 
Because Japan has a unitary parliamentary government, a tradi-
tional legal analysis might have been deceptively simple. An interna-
tional agreement affecting private rights must be submitted to the 
National Diet. Treaties approved by the Diet then take precedence 
over domestic law, and a full measure of judicial review is available. 
In fact, most of the MTN agreements were submitted to the Diet and 
were approved by it. The Diet also passed the necessary changes in 
domestic law, and the ministries changed regulations as required. 
Since the Japanese delegatio:r;i that negotiated the MTN agreements 
represented ministers drawn from the parliament (and from the domi-
nant political party), on the surface the process was quite 
straightforward. 
Matsushita enriches his basic outline with descriptions of impor-
tant related phenomena, such as conflicts among ministries fighting on 
behalf of particular constituencies and the extraparliamentary rela-
tionships (notably those between the bureaucracy and the ruling Lib-
eral Democratic Party) that are critical to the development of 
legislation. He also includes a comprehensive summary of the basic 
laws regulating international trade, and he emphasizes the importance 
of the administrative process in their application. Regular features of 
this process include wide discretion on the part of administrators, fre-
12. For an extensive discussion of the Tokyo Round negotiation and the substance and im-
mediate implementation of each of the MTN agreements, see L. GLICK, MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS - WORLD TRADE AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND (1984). 
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quent resort to informal guidance, and government-directed private 
agreements as policy-implementing devices. 
The author also summarizes a number of complaints of protection-
ism leveled against Japanese practice in government procurement and 
in administering technical product standards (such as inspection pro-
cedures and health requirements). He outlines the measures adopted 
to meet those complaints, and underscores the role of unofficial orga-
nizations in resolving trade problems. Finally, he explains the system 
of judicial review that is theoretically available to challenge govern-
ment action that is allegedly contrary to the MTN agreements, but 
states that Japanese companies are "less inclined [than foreign firms] 
to use legal actions to cope with troubles with the government" (p. 
131). 
Three distinctive features of the Japanese system emerge as critical 
for understanding its operation: the historically rooted symbiotic rela-
tionship of government and business, the critical importance of admin-
istrative power wielded by the bureaucracy, and the frequent reliance 
on informal methods of operation and control. While these features 
seem consistent with my nonspecialist's view of Japan, they also seem 
fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of elevating the role of adju-
dication to the extent proposed by the authors in their conclusion. 
Nevertheless, Matsushita's brief account provides a satisfying outline 
of the Japanese legal landscape. 
B. The European Economic Community 
The chapter on the EEC is less felicitous. Poorly edited, some-
what dense and frequently confusing, it may simply reflect the uncer-
tainty surrounding some of the issues raised. 
In this study, the EEC itself is viewed as a federal system. Because 
its member-states have quite recently been fully independent, and be-
cause at least some of them have been deeply ambivalent about trans-
ferring sovereignty to a central government, the obvious first question 
concerns the EEC's competence to negotiate the MTN agreements. 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome, however, transferred authority over "com-
mon commercial policy" to the EEC. Thus, issues of federalism ap-
parently did not loom large in the Tokyo Round negotiations, at least 
until the end, although some matters may have been excluded from 
the negotiations-because of doubts as to EEC authority. 
The governmental structure established by the Treaty of Rome did 
have subtle effects on the development of international economic 
norms. The fourteen-member Commission is the "executive" body of 
the Community. It is said to adopt a Community-wide perspective 
and to represent "only the global interest" (p. 22) of the Community. 13 
13. As a nonspecialist, I wonder about the extent to which the Commission may, in fact, 
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The Commission operates under directives from a Council of Minis-
ters, which may be seen as a "legislative" organ, consisting of the ten 
member-states each acting in its individual national interest.14 
Although this structure suggests a potential for legislative-executive 
conflicts, like those in the United States, problems of that nature ap-
parently did not arise in the Tokyo Round negotiations because mem-
ber-states kept tight control of the Commission through other means. 
In the negotiations the Commission was constrained by an unusually 
important role assumed by the special "Committee of Article 113" 
(named after the article of the Treaty of Rome that authorizes its es-
tablishment), made up of representatives of the ten member-states act-
ing in national capacities, and an ad hoc body of national experts 
whose power was enhanced by the technical nature of the negotiations 
(pp. 27-28). 
The most interesting aspect of the EEC constitutional structure re-
vealed by Professor Louis is the general shift of power in the area of 
commercial policy from national parliaments to executive authorities. 
The European parliament has not yet been able to assert a significant 
role in this area. Accordingly, the principal source of restraint on the 
supranational Commission is the Council of Ministers, which is itself 
composed of executive officials. Legislative supervision and control 
over commercial policy, whether by the federal or national parlia-
ments, has therefore been lost by the creation of the Common Market. 
This development would seem to be of major importance to the viabil-
ity of Community law-making ventures, although Professor Louis 
does not elaborate on its implications.15 
Finally, the availability of judicial review to enforce EEC obliga-
tions under the MTN agreements is unclear. Given the improbability 
that courts will be used much in Japan, the United States may tum out 
to be the only jurisdiction in which the judiciary will play an impor-
tant role in the implementation of the MTN agreements. This is the 
kind of disparity in the effectiveness of international obligations that is 
of great concern to the authors. Nevertheless, the lack of a clear com-
mitment to judicial review in Japan and the EEC suggests further 
skepticism about the authors' concluding proposal for a supercourt.16 
continue to reflect more parochial national interests, a point on which I would have preferred 
more discussion by Professor Louis. 
14. The official names of these institutions are "The Commission of the European Communi-
ties" and "The Council of the European Communities." I have used the technically inaccurate 
term "Council of Ministers" as a shorthand expression for the latter because it more accurately 
describes the composition of the body. For a general outline of the Commission-Council struc-
ture, see E. STEIN, P. H,w & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS lN PERSPECTIVE 30-42 (1976). 
15. This is not to say that affected interests do not exert influence on the Commission. The 
Economic and Social Committee serves as a forum for this purpose. P. 46. 
16. One also wonders what France and Great Britain, given their ambivalence about trans-
fers of "sovereignty," would think about the supercourt. 
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Professor Jackson's chapter provides a good review of the United 
States' constitutional landscape affecting international economic 
agreements. He particularly notes the congressional constraints on the 
negotiation, acceptance and implementation of agreements. He also 
sketches the history of U.S. involvement with the GATT and the 
events leading up to U.S. participation in the Tokyo Round. 
In addition to providing a conventional exposition of legal doc-
trine, Jackson's account is useful for its description of the political 
context in which the Trade Act of 1974 was enacted, the bureaucratic 
structure that heavily influences U.S. trade policy, and the sources of 
Congress' dissatisfaction with the performance of the State and Treas-
ury departments. Distrust of the executive led Congress, in the 1974 
act, to delegate authority sparingly, and to assume particularly close 
control over the nontariff barrier agreements that formed the core of 
the Tokyo Round. Thus, Congress required that industry and legisla-
tive branch representatives be involved in the formulation of the U.S. 
negotiating position as well as in the negotiation itself. The agree-
ments were implemented under a special procedure requiring a specific 
act of Congress. 
Jackson's description of the role of Congress at the conclusion of 
the negotiation is especially interesting. Because the nontariff barrier 
agreements of the MTN could not be implemented without congres-
sional approval, the precise terms of the implementing legislation were 
of critical importance to the effectiveness of the MTN agreements 
under U.S. law. Consequently foreign governments, notably the EEC, 
had a considerable interest in the "internal" negotiation of the terms 
of that legislation by the executive branch and Congress. The result 
was a multi-cornered negotiation of the final details of some of the 
codes among the EEC, the Congress and the executive branch, a pro-
cess that confounded conventional notions of separation of powers and 
international law. This experience, more than any other described in 
the book, illustrates its thesis that domestic law shapes the real effec-
tiveness of trade agreements. It also shows that the traditional view 
maintained in international law theory of a government as a single 
entity (embodied in its executive ministry of foreign affairs) can be 
quite misleading. 
After explaining the steps taken by the United States to implement 
the MTN agreements, Jackson explains the system of private remedies 
available to enforce the obligations. Under U.S. law a private firm 
may file a petition with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) alleg-
ing an "unfair" trade practice (including a violation of a trade agree-
ment) by a foreign government. Thereupon the USTR must either 
open an investigation and raise the matter officially with the foreign 
government, or state publicly why it is not going to do so. In view of 
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the political difficulties of the latter alternative, this system practically 
forces the government to take diplomatic action against a foreign state 
upon demand by a private interest. This, then, is another manifesta-
tion of Congress' distrust of the executive branch's willingness to 
"stand up for the rights of American business." The result is a "high 
degree of legalization" (p. 177) of the MTN agreements in American 
law, which Jackson and his coauthors applaud as the desired course 
for future development. The supercourt naturally follows. 
II 
I am skeptical about the supercourt proposal, in part for the rea-
sons suggested by the central argument of the book. The authors 
demonstrate the critical importance of domestic law in determining 
the scope and effectiveness of international obligations. I would argue 
that behind their thesis lies a more fundamental lesson about the ne-
cessity of a solid connection between law and political community. 
The material in the book shows the importance, even the necessity, 
of invoking normal (and generally accepted) law-making processes in 
order to carry out international obligations. The book also shows that 
it is equally critical to involve domestic political constituencies in in-
ternational decisions affecting their important interests. These lessons 
simply underscore the fact that the governments studied, and most 
governments important to international trade, are in one way or an-
other representative governments. Their legitimacy and ability to 
maintain their authority depends on a measure of voluntary accept-
ance of their actions by their people. In turn, they gain acceptance by 
being responsive to the immediate interests of important constituen-
cies. This process of representation provides an essential connection 
between international law and domestic political community. 
The proposal for an international supercourt, on the other hand, 
seems to contemplate the imposition of rules from "above" the na-
tional systems. It is difficult for me to imagine a supercourt that could 
be adequately rooted in the various political communities that would 
have to accept the scheme.17 Theoretically, I concede, my objection 
would disappear if accession to the supercourt were itself effected 
through regular national political processes. Thus, for the United 
States, the President could negotiate such an agreement and the Con-
gress could approve it, thereby subjecting the new procedure to the 
scrutiny of the domestic political process, with all the attendant ad-
vantages of publicity, consensus building and acceptance resulting 
17. One must be similarly skeptical of self-executing treaties, see Trimble, Legal Scholarship 
and the ILO, 6 CoMP. LAB. L. 212, 216-21 (1984), and customary international law (the subject 
of a forthcoming article by the author) in the American system. One may also wonder about the 
solidity of agreements approved by the EEC without participation of national parliaments be-
cause such agreements lack the stamp of political effectiveness and approval. 
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from that process. To this argument I offer five objections. I shall 
limit my counterarguments to the United States context, although I 
suspect that comparable arguments could be developed with respect to 
other systems as well. 
A. Objections to the Supercourt 
1. Impracticability 
It seems inconceivable that a President (Republican or Democrat) 
or the Congress would go along with the proposal. In the United 
States a distrust of international supervision is deeply embedded in our 
political tradition and has been repeatedly demonstrated in this cen-
tury.18 The Senate frustrated a variety of attempts to conclude arbi-
tration treaties by Presidents Cleveland, McKinley, Roosevelt and 
Taft. It then repudiated the League of Nations, and for twelve years 
stalled consideration of U.S. participation in the World Court before 
finally rejecting it in 1935. When the Senate eventually consented to 
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in 1945, it did so 
only with a reservation that essentially negated the effect of ratifica-
tion. More recently, the prospect of international supervision has led 
the Senate to refuse to consider the Human Rights Conventions.19 
President Carter did not even submit to the Senate the Optional Proto-
col to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
would have subjected the United States to international supervision. 
These are not isolated acts. They reflect a deep and enduring 
American attitude toward law-making authority removed from repre-
sentative control. The authors clearly share my skepticism on this 
score, citing "the typical government reluctance to relinquish any 
power or to constrain its field of discretion" (p. 209). I think, how-
ever, that the causes of this reluctance are deeper than the egos of 
bureaucrats and politicians. They are expressed in basic national 
political philosophy. Even the active involvement of the United States 
in world affairs, and the dramatically increased national interdepen-
dence of the international economy, will alter this attitude only slowly, 
if at all. In the next section, I will explain why I think that this atti-
tude should not be changed. 
2. Political Philosophy 
My objection is more than a prediction that Congress will reject 
the scheme. In reaching the conclusion that a supercourt should not 
be accepted, I start with the assumption that any exercise of authority 
18. See e.g., R. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 1-35 (1969). 
19. See Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 19 CoLUM. L. REV. 405, 422 (1979) ("A 
deep isolationism continues to motivate many Americans, even some who are eager to judge 
others and to intercede on behalf of human rights in other countries."); Rusk, A Personal Reflec-
tion on the International Covenants on Human Rights, 9 HoFSrRA L. REV. 515, 517-21 (1981). 
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by a government should be explained by a coherent theory of power 
that is acceptable to the relevant political community. Accordingly, I 
look to American political philosophy and tradition in order to test 
the novel supranational authority proposed by the authors. In this 
regard the proposal does not pass muster. 
The kind of international law making envisioned by the authors 
cannot easily be reconciled with American political tradition.2° For 
over 200 years the theory and rhetoric used to justify law making in 
the United States has exalted limited and representative government 
resting on the "consent of the governed." Authority is said to be dele-
gated to a federal government of limited powers, with law making con-
centrated in politically accountable branches of government that are 
responsive to the interests of their constituencies. It is true that we 
entrust wide law-making power to unelected judges, but they are prod-
ucts of the domestic political system and in fact are responsive to polit-
ical changes in society. Judges read the newspapers and follow the 
election returns. 
Supercourt judges, on the other hand, would not be similarly re-
sponsive. Given the number of different cultures and countries repre-
sented, they probably could not be. Indeed, judges of the supercourt 
would presumably be selected in a manner designed to assure their 
independence of national perspectives. Even so, it is doubtful that 
they would regard themselves (or be regarded by others) as products 
of an international polity, or that they would be adequately divested of 
national parochialism. 21 
There are, of course, several contemporary examples of interna-
tional tribunals rendering decisions that affect the United States. It 
may be asked how their authority can be explained under the test I 
have proposed. The existing GATT Panels, for example, consist of 
representatives of neutral parties acting in "individual" capacities. 
Their recommendations, however, are made to the GATT Council, a 
political body, and implementation depends on the engagement of reg-
ular national political processes.22 
The authors' proposed scheme more closely resembles the tradi-
tional form of arbitration or adjudication of intergovernmental dis-
putes. In those cases, decisions are typically binding without further 
20. In this Part I have drawn on, inter alia, B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); D. BooRSrIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN PoLmcs (1953); 
H. CoMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 310-35 (1950); L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADmoN IN 
AMERICA (1955); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN PoLmCAL TRADmoN (2d ed. 1973); Mas-
ters, The Lockean Tradition in American Foreign Policy, in THEORY AND REALITY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS (J. Farrell & A. Smith eds. 1967). 
21. For discussions of similar problems in the context of the ICJ, see T. FRANCK, THE 
STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY - EXAMINING THE RIDDLE OF ONE LAW IN A FRAGMENTED 
WORLD 250-71 (1968); L. PROIT, THE LATENT POWER OF CULTURE AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL JUDGE (1979). 
22. See generally R. HUDEC, supra note 7. 
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political action by the losing party. Those cases are few,23 however, 
and normally are limited to a particular dispute, like the U.S.-Canada 
maritime boundary case,24 or to a narrow subject matter, like the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal.25 They thus involve situations in which the 
stakes are not as high, and the risks not as open-ended, as would be 
the case where a court had general authority over "international 
trade." 
It could be argued that my preoccupation with American tradition 
is misplaced. Perhaps we need to change our political philosophy to 
accommodate explanations of authority that are more adequate to the 
modern world of economic interdependence, environmental degrada-
tion and nuclear terror.26 I would not be opposed to such an effort, 
but no satisfactory alternative has been offered. I am deeply skeptical 
of notions of international community and world values, not only be-
cause I see little basis in reality for maintaining their existence, but 
also because I am not convinced that the "world government" conclu-
sions frequently implied by those notions are desirable. Among other 
disadvantages, the values of personal autonomy and community con-
trol that many of us prize most highly could be lost. I suspect that 
people in other cultures would harbor the same fears, although for 
different reasons. 
3. The Undesirable Effects of Emphasizing Economic over Political 
Values 
There is a third general objection to the authors' recommendation. 
The proposal may be seen as another attempt to enhance the "rule of 
law" in international relations. The "law" involved here, as in many 
other proposals to apply law to foreign policy, would protect commer-
cial interests against government intervention. In this scheme private 
economic planning is more important than government regulation. In 
the contest between economic and political values, the latter would 
yield. 
The authors of course recognize that free trade values are not the 
only concern of government. Professor Jackson has elsewhere ac-
knowledged that perhaps "big" cases (like automobiles and steel) 
23. J. SWEENEY, C. OUVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM - CASES 
AND MATERIAIS 67-74 (2d ed. 1981). 
24. See World Court Settles Dispute on U.S.-Canada Boundary, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, at 
A3, col. 4. 
25. See Carter, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Observations on the First Year, 29 
UCLA L. REv. 1076 (1982). 
26. Professor Falk is a leading advocate of the approach discussed in this section. See R. 
FALK, THE END OF WORLD ORDER (1983); R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNA-
TIONAL SOCIETY (1970); Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law -
Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. R.Ev. 231 (1964). 
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could not be handled within an adjudicatory system. 27 In those cases 
"political" pressures would require departure from the solutions de-
manded by economists' rules. The legalists regard political pressures 
as causing unfortunate, if sometimes necessary, deviations from the 
pure pursuit of objective adjudication. 
On the other hand, I see political pressure as a natural, and even 
laudable, feature of our political system. I do not see a basis for distin-
guishing "big" cases from "small" ones. If political pressure works for 
the strong, it should be permitted to work for the less strong as well. 
If the conflict between free trade and community interests over steel is 
to be resolved in the politically accountable Congress and executive 
branch, the same conflict over mushrooms should be resolved the 
same way. Special interests may command special attention in the pro-
cess, but that is characteristic of the general political system. 
There also is no reason why free trade or economic factors should 
be automatically or even normally entitled to priority over political 
factors, even foreign policy concerns. The law of comparative advan-
tage may dictate that the United States should sell computers to the 
Soviet Union and that steel should be made in Korea, but even the 
legalists agree that there must be limits to the pursuit of profit and free 
trade -theory. 
In the specific context of the GATT, the question comes down to 
who will be primarily in charge of trade policy - elected officials and 
political branch bureaucrats, who are responsive to the constituencies 
of their districts and agencies, or private litigants and international 
judges, who are responsive to a body of rules. In favoring the former I 
simply doubt that rules can be drafted with sufficient prescience, or 
that they can be changed quickly enough, to respond to the legitimate 
needs of domestic constituencies. Free trade is an important goal, but 
it is not the only one, and I· doubt our capacity to create institutions 
that will respond the way we expect representative government to re-
spond. Some observers may think that the executive branch has not 
been sufficiently responsive to domestic interests, and others may be-
lieve that special interests have too much influence. I trust the polit-
ical process to reach a fair balance.28 In my view the value of 
representative government outweighs the value of free trade. 
As I noted at th_e outset, however, the legalists have scored some 
victories in their quest for the "rule of law." Fortunately their mo-
mentum has been blunted. While the "commercial activity" doctrine 
permits lawsuits against foreign governments, the courts have appar-
27. See Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 
AM. J. INTL. L. 747, 779-80 (1978). 
28. For theoretical accounts reflecting my approach, see R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMO-
CRATIC THEORY (1956); D. MAYHEW, CoNGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CoNNECTION (1974). 
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ently reacted by expanding the act of state doctrine.29 And although 
the political question doctrine may be in general retreat domestically, 
it still seems vibrant in the foreign affairs field. 30 American judges 
have been conspicuously cautious in applying rules to unfamiliar areas 
involving foreign relations. Their example suggests further caution 
before accepting the legalist line. 
4. The Undesirability of a Strict ''Rule of Law" in International 
Trade 
My fourth point focuses specifically on the debate over how best to 
understand the GATT's contribution to the "rule of law." I agree 
with the authors that governments will be reluctant to accept their 
proposal. One reason is that many GA TT obligations are intention-
ally general or vague, concealing important differences of opinion. 
The Subsidies Code is a good example.31 Judicial interpretation would 
disrupt the appearance of agreement by applying the language of a 
convention in unambiguous concrete ways. It could also inhibit the 
successful negotiation of future agreements. Although one may object 
that such agreements are undesirable anyway, I would respond that 
vague agreements are frequently important politically. Indeed, vague 
agreements may be the only agreements possible. Even if an agree-
ment does not reflect a "genuine meeting of the minds," it may tempo-
rarily defuse conflicts, make other agreements possible, or help hold 
the jerry-rigged system together for another few years during which 
the conditions for real agreement may improve. 
Judicial clarification is inconsistent with this approach. Here too I 
side with the pragmatists and see a major value of the GA TT in its 
ambiguous, flexible and "nonlegal" approach. In view of the GATT's 
success, the proponents of radical change bear a heavy burden of per-
suasion to justify abandonment of the GATT's self-conscious accom-
modation to political reality. 
5. Adverse Effects on Free Trade 
Finally, it is not clear that international litigation to enforce rules 
29. See, e.g., International Assn. of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, 
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 984 (1977); Allied Bank Intl. v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) revd., 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) (declining to apply act of state doctrine 
outside national territory); see also Leigh, Judicial Decisions - Allied Bank Intl. v. Banco Cred-
ito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N. Y. 1983), 78 AM. J. INTI.. L. 441, 443 (1984). 
30. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); 
de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1545-50, 1550-66 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Tamm, 
J., and Scalia, J., dissenting); Occidental ofUmm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d 
1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979). 
31. For a description of the disagreements involved in the negotiation of this Code, see Riv-
ers & Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Bridging 
Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 LAW & POL. IN INTI.. Bus. 1447 (1979). 
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will even serve to promote an open trading system. In theory it may 
sound desirable. U.S. exporters could strike down Japanese quotas 
maintained in violation of article XI of the GATT. A German ex-
porter of specialty steel could sue to force U.S. revocation of escape 
clause relief recently granted to the specialty steel industry.32 There is 
no problem for free trade as long as the suit is brought against an 
inefficient producer hiding behind an illegal practice. 
On the other hand, suits by competitors to enforce rules against 
"unfair" actions (like subsidies) are just as likely. Thus, the threatened 
U.S. steel industry could sue to halt illegal Brazilian subsidies.33 Such 
litigation may simply lead the defendant government to do whatever is 
necessary to stop the lawsuit, and not necessarily to change its prac-
tices to conform to the rules. Even if one believes the classic argument 
that subsidization ( or dumping) is unfair, and therefore ought to be 
eliminated, the range of opinion among nations about subsidies and 
dumping is so wide, and the practices subject to attack so entrenched, 
that it seems extremely doubtful that litigation to resolve the differ-
ences of opinion would be tolerated. The result of domestic litigation 
by the steel industry has been the effective cartelization of world steel 
trade through "voluntary" restraint agreements. The likely result of 
establishing a supercourt would simply be more "voluntary" agree-
ments, serving protectionist rather than free trade objectives. The 
"high degree of legalization" of the U.S. system applauded by the 
book under review has itself been seen by some observers as a nontariff 
barrier. 
B. The Benefits of ''Limitations" 
There is another respect in which the book does not follow through 
the implications of its basic thesis. The authors focus on the con-
straints imposed by domestic law - limitations on negotiating author-
ity and burdensome legislative requirements for implementation. I 
would equally stress the strengths derived from those constraints. An 
international norm that has been approved after scrutiny in a coun-
try's regular law-making processes is more likely to be effective law. 
Thus, it may be difficult for the American executive branch to ne-
gotiate an agreement establishing a relatively open international re-
gime regulating trade in steel because the Congress would have to 
approve such an agreement. But if Congress did approve it, the obli-
gations would be all the stronger by virtue of the congressional action. 
Not only would the result be more likely to be accepted by the affected 
interests within the American political community, but because of the 
32. See President Grants U.S. Specialty Steel Industry Four Years of Quotas, Tariffs, 8 U.S. 
IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 519 (July 6, 1983). 
33. See, e.g., ITC Issues Final Affirmative Rulings on Brazilian Stainless Steel Products. 8 
U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 459 (June 22, 1983). 
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congressional action the result would be protected by the judiciary in a 
way that a presidential agreement without congressional support 
would normally not be. 34 
The cumbersome political and legislative processes may therefore 
be necessary to transform international law from diplomatic theory to 
practical reality. Indeed, the key to effective international law making 
lies in the domestic political process so well described in the main part 
of this book, not in the chimerical international court advocated in its 
conclusion. 
34. See Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
1004 (1975). 
